Cuba’s
National Assembly hashed through and approved the draft of a new constitution
last weekend, its discussion guided by Homero Acosta, a sort of Publius-without-the-pseudonym
who chaired the group that researched and studied constitutional issues and
produced the draft. His day job is executive secretary to the Council of State.
Acosta’s
title-by-title discussion of the draft is summarized briefly
in Granma and can be seen in two long videos here and here.
The
draft has not yet been published, and there are, according to Acosta, more than
50 new “norms” that will have to be legislated to accompany it once it is
approved.
Starting
with the presidency, what’s clear is that with the Castro era ended, the Cuban
leadership has decided that it wants no one older than 60 assuming that office,
it wants no one in it for more than two five-year terms, and it wants executive
functions distributed between a president and newly created prime minister.
These
conditions would have ended Fidel Castro’s presidency in 1986 and prevented
Raul’s altogether.
Beyond
that, not much is clear. Why was it decided in the first place that a prime
minister is needed? Will the president’s power be limited, or will the prime
minister be sort of a minister of the presidency who handles day-to-day
functions such as overseeing executive agencies? Will the prime minister be subordinate
to the president? Perhaps the full text will answer these questions when it is
published. Perhaps they will be answered once a prime minister is in office. Or
perhaps we will be guessing for years, because this is a political system where
very little is known about high-level decisionmaking, and there’s no evidence
that this is likely to change.
In the meantime,
note that the incumbent president is second-in-command of the Communist Party
and the prime minister is not; the president nominates the prime minister; the
president can propose legislation and the prime minister cannot; the president
has the power to promote and remove high-ranking military officers and the
prime minister does not; the president has exclusive pardon power; and changes
in the composition of the cabinet are initiated when the prime minister
proposes changes to the president. In addition, there are unspecified powers
that rested with the Council of State that now go to the president. None of
this fits the thesis that the new structure is intended to clip the president’s
wings.