USAID contractor Alan Gross, 64, has been captive
in Cuba for four years and is wondering if anyone cares about getting him out
before he serves the remaining 11 years of his jail sentence.
Those who most support the program that sent him
to Cuba and who defend his activities there – the Obama Administration, Senator
Menendez and allies in Congress – seem to have the least to offer when it comes
to bringing him home.
Their solution is clear and simple: demand his
unilateral and unconditional release.
(See this letter from Senator Menendez
and this State Department statement.)
It’s all well and good to have a democracy
development program that expands Internet access around the world. And it sounds good to carry out that program
wherever we like as if the concept of national sovereignty is quaint and
irrelevant because, as Secretary Clinton used to argue, access to information
is a universal right.
All that idealism makes for good political
speeches and strong-sounding letters to the President, it keeps the program
going in Congress, and it provides the money that got Alan Gross the
businessman interested in becoming a USAID operative in Cuba.
But the idealism was of no help to Alan Gross the
operative because the program ignored – as did Mr. Gross – some basic
operational realities. Such as: The
Cuban government cares about its own sovereignty especially vis-à-vis the
United States. The Cuban intelligence
service is not a casual, 9-to-5 operation.
It is foolish to send anyone, much less an untrained USAID contractor,
to operate on that service’s home turf.
And the placement of satellite Internet units with Wi-Fi hotspots would
probably appear to the Cuban government to be a lot more than assistance to the
Jewish community, especially because the operation was funded by a U.S. law
(Helms-Burton) that seeks to overturn the political order in Cuba.
It has been four years and the demands for Mr.
Gross’ unconditional release have not worked.
Is anyone responsible now for finding an approach that does work?
The Bush Administration designed the satellite
Internet program and issued the contract that sent Mr. Gross to Cuba, but the
Bush Administration is out of office.
USAID, to be fair, has long included warnings in
its documents about its Cuba program that the program is illegal in Cuba and its
operatives are at risk there. USAID bristles
at the idea that Mr. Gross would be traded for someone else, because that is
how we get spies released, and Mr. Gross was not a spy. The implication seems to be that USAID’s work
is on a higher moral plane than that of intelligence agencies. The time to think of such niceties, I would
say, was before the agency decided to send contractors to attempt to operate
covertly, or “discreetly” as USAID prefers to say, in another country.
The Obama Administration didn’t make the decision
to send Mr. Gross to Cuba, but he went on the Administration’s watch, albeit in
its first year when its personnel were still being placed in their jobs and
those who were in place were not monitoring the missions of U.S. contractors to
Cuba.
Supporters of the USAID Cuba programs blame the
Cuban government for, of course, arresting and sentencing Mr. Gross, and never
seem troubled by the program’s naive operational design which led to the loss
of one man’s freedom, the total waste of taxpayer dollars, and the gift of
satellite equipment to the Cuban government.
This letter from Senator
Leahy
and 65 other Senators seems to tell President Obama that it is his
responsibility to act by taking “whatever steps are in the national interest to
obtain his release.” Taken together with
Senator Menendez’ letter urging the President to stick with the demands of the past
four years, signed by only 14 Senators, this is a clear message to the
President that his approach serves neither Mr. Gross nor the national interest,
and should change.
The hangup for many is that the United States
might give something to Cuba in return for Mr. Gross’ release. That’s understandable, but it’s not an
objection that comes up in other cases where we bargain for the release of our
people.
No one objected when the United States paid Egypt – a government that
gets more than $1 billion in U.S. aid each year – $330,000 per head for the
release of staffers for the International Republican Institute and the
International Democratic Institute last year.
(They operated openly, but were arrested because the Egyptian government
disliked their activities.) Two of those
who signed Senator Menendez’ letter, Senators McCain and Kirk, are directors of
the International Republican Institute.
No one objected in 2010 when we obtained the release of four Russians who
had apparently been working for us by sending 10 freshly arrested Russian
agents home. The whole thing took 11
days, from the arrest of the Russians to their flight home.
No one objected in 2011 when the United States
worked out an arrangement in which $1.5 million was paid to Iran for the release of
three hapless American hikers who apparently crossed into Iranian territory.
So what can President Obama do?
He can get involved as he has in the
case of Robert Levinson, an American held in Iran since 2007. Mr. Levinson is described as a retired FBI agent
who went to Iran on a tobacco company’s behalf to investigate cigarette
smuggling. President Obama has spoken on the phone to the President of
Iran about the case. In the photo above,
he is shown meeting with Mr. Levinson’s wife. Update: Levinson is a retired FBI agent and then some, AP
reports.
On a strategic level, he can try to do with Cuba
what he is attempting to do with Iran, where he is trying to solve both the
immediate concern (nuclear development) and to find a way to put relations with
that country on a better plane, for our benefit and that of the region. A tall order, but a wise use of American
leadership that does not put military action front and center.
In Cuba’s case the immediate issue of Mr. Gross
is far simpler and there is no issue that threatens U.S. or regional security. If President Obama starts serious discussions
with Cuba, the end-game might not involve direct bargaining for Mr. Gross, but
rather a series of measures to improve U.S.-Cuba relations where his release is
one of many results. If U.S. policy
changes in the bargain, so much the better.
Since so much of our policy toward Cuba is contrary to our own
interests, we could come out ahead, far more than the President imagines.
No comments:
Post a Comment